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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY-THE




L ike Hamlet's father, state sovereignty is a ghost that refuses to
remain in repose. Not too long ago, the concept of the states as
independent sovereignties appeared to be an anachronistic survival
from pre-Civil War days. The century since that time has seen a
dramatic shift in the federal system's constitutional center of gravity. It
is, in Justice Jackson's words, "undeniable that . . . we have been in a
cycle of rapid centralization, and Court opinions have sanctioned a
considerable concentration of power in the federal government with a
corresponding diminution in the authority and prestige of state gov-
ernments." '
During the past four decades the Supreme Court has all but over-
turned the previous limitations on the exercise of federal authority. 2 So
far-reaching had the development in this respect become that observers
could have asked whether it portended the replacement of the federal
system by a unitary government in which the states would be reduced
to vestigial appendages of an all-powerful nation. If the states still had
"something of the magic of Athens and of Rome," '3 perhaps they were
also destined to share the ultimate fate of those once-flourishing
polities, so far as the reality of governmental power is concerned.
With the decision of the Supreme Court in National League qf Cities
v. Usely,4 it may turn out that the demise of the federal system bears a
resemblance to the now legendary report of Mark Twain's death. For
the first time since the "constitutional revolution" of the 1930's, the
Court struck down an exercise of congressional power under the
commerce clause, and it did so on the ground that the federal statute at
issue invalidly impinged upon the operation of the states as coordinate
independent governments. If anything seemed inconsistent with the
past four decades of concentration of authority in the federal govern-
ment, it was the notion that the states still possess the attributes of
* Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. R. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 65-66 (19551 See
generally Kurland, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 162-63
(1964).
2. See notes 34-63 infra and accompanying text.
3. H. Laski, The American Democracy 139 (1948).
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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sovereignty. Now the Supreme Court itself has relied upon "traditional
aspects of state sovereignty" 5 in invalidating a federal statute. This led
Justice Brennan to refer to "the newly announced 'state sovereignty'
doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery."6
How far does this doctrine extend? What are its implications? These
are the questions to which this Article is directed. But first a brief
discussion of the National League of Cities decision itself is appropri-
ate.
II. National League of Cities v. Usery
National League of Cities v. Usery arose out of certain sections of
the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. 7 The original Act of
19388 specifically excluded the states and their political subdivisions
from its coverage. 9 By the 1974 amendments, Congress removed the
exclusion, expressly extending the federal minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour requirements to public employees employed by the states
and by their various political subdivisions.' 0 Appellants in National
League of Cities challenged the validity of the 1974 amendments. The
Court upheld their challenge and ruled that the amendments invalidly
attempted to impose upon the states the same wage and hour require-
ments already imposed upon private employers.
The Court recognized that the conditions of employment of the
public employees covered by the 1974 amendments were not beyond
the scope of the federal commerce power had those employees been
employed in the private sector. But the decisions establishing the
breadth of congressional authority under the commerce clause involved
laws regulating private individuals and businesses. II A different situa-
5. Id. at 849.
6. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 822 n.4 (1976) (dissenting opinion)
7. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), (5), (6), 88 Stat. 55 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s), (x)
(1970)).
8. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
201-219 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)).
9. "As used in this Act. . . 'Employer' ... shall not include the United States or any State or
political subdivision of a State . Id. § 3 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. IV
1974)).
10. "As used in this chapter... 'Employer' includes ... a public agency . 29 U.S.C §
203(d) (Supp. IV 1974). "The employees of an enterprise which is a public agency shall for
purposes of this subsection be deemed to be employees engaged in commerce, or in the production
of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or
materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce . I..." d. § 203(s). " 'Public
agency' means ... the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of. . .a
State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." Id. § 203(x).
11. See notes 34-64 infra and accompanying text. An exception was Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968), involving state operation of schools and hospitals. See text accompanying notes
87-89 infra.
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tion exists when Congress seeks to exercise the commerce power in a
manner which infringes upon the existence of the states as essential
elements of the federal system: "[T]here are limits upon the power of
Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its oth-
erwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are
conferred by Art. I of the Constitution."1 2
As stated by the Court, National League of Cities involves a simple
application of the principle that the powers enumerated in article I,
section 8, may not be exercised in violation of other constitutional
provisions. Thus the power to tax and spend has been construed most
broadly in the past quarter century. 13 But Congress may not impose a
tax upon newspapers alone in violation of the first amendment.14 Nor
may it exercise its taxing power to compel self-incrimination in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment, through registration and tax payment
requirements which reveal violations of the comprehensive state and
federal drug and gambling prohibitions."' The same is true of the
commerce clause, which the National League of Cities opinion itself
refers to as a grant of plenary authority. 16 Congressional enactments
fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the com-
merce clause may nonetheless be invalid when found to infringe on
first amendment liberties 17 or to offend against the right to jury trial'8
or due process. 19
The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 may have fallen
within the breadth of authority granted by the commerce clause; but
when Congress sought to regulate the activities of the states as public
employers, it transgressed a limitation on exercise of its power com-
parable to the provisions of the first, fifth, and sixth amendments
referred to in the prior paragraph. The states are immune from federal
regulation in the performance of their governmental activities, and the
challenged provision violated this immunity by directly supplanting
the choices of the states as to employment policies. Congress may not
exercise its commerce clause authority in a fashion that would impair
the states' ability to function effectively as separate and independent
entities that is implicit in the federal system embodied in the Constitu-
tion.
12. 426 U.S. at 842.
13. See notes 113-23 infra and accompanying text.
14. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
15. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968).
16. 426 U.S. at 840.
17. See id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
19. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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III. COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
A. From Marshall to Darby
The National League of Cities decision represents the first Supreme
Court check on congressional exercise of the commerce power since the
course of commerce clause jurisprudence was drastically altered by
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 20 four decades ago. The
starting point of the commerce clause case law is, of course, Gibbons v.
Ogden,21 where "Chief Justice Marshall described the federal com-
merce power with a breadth never yet exceeded." '2 2 His expansive
interpretation did not, however, survive Marshall himself. For a
century after the great Chief Justice's death the Court adopted a more
circumscribed interpretation of the commerce power.
The key words in the commerce clause are the noun "commerce"
(which determines the subjects to which congressional power extends)
and the verb "to regulate" (which determines the type of authority that
Congress can exert). Both the noun and the verb were defined most
broadly by Marshall, and both were drastically restricted by the
post-Marshall Court. Marshall had an organic conception of com-
merce; 23 the test of whether a particular activity was subject to
congressional power was in his conception not mere movement across
state lines, but whether the particular commerce affected more than
one state. In the post-Marshall Court the criterion became the physical
crossing of state lines. While commerce remained within a state, it
remained solely within state power. It did not matter that it had
impacts that radiated beyond the state's borders:
Nor can it be properly concluded, that, because the products of domestic enterprise in
agriculture or manufactures, or in the arts, may ultimately become the subjects of
foreign commerce, that the control of the means or the encouragements by which
enterprise is fostered and protected, is legitimately within the import of the phrase
foreign commerce, or fairly implied in any investiture of the power to regulate such
commerce. 24
The result was to exclude from the federal commerce power vir-
tually all productive activities. "Commerce," declared the Court in
1895, "succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it. ' '2 s The same
20. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
21. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
22. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
23. See F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 42 (1937).
24. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 567, 574 (1852).
25. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
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was true of agriculture, 26 mining,2 7 oil production, 28 electric power
generation, 29 and all other productive industries. 30
A comparable restriction was imposed upon the reach of the con-
gressional power to regulate. "[W]hat is this power?" Marshall had
asked. 31 "It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed. '32 To Marshall's successors, the
determination that the law at issue prescribed a rule by which the
particular commerce was to be governed was not the end of the
inquiry. The Court also had to determine whether the congressional
prescription of the rule was motivated by an improper purpose. Thus a
federal law prohibiting transporation in interstate commerce of goods
made in factories that employed child labor was, on its face, patently a
regulation of commerce; i.e., it prescribed the prohibitory rule by
which the goods concerned were to be governed. But the congressional
purpose was to suppress child labor, and Hammer v. Dagenhar133 held
that that rendered the law invalid. Congress could not use its prohib-
itory power over interstate transportation to exert regulatory authority
over manufacturing, which, under the then-prevailing law, was not
commerce.
The restricted post-Marshall interpretation of the commerce clause
is, however, now a matter of legal history. Starting with Jones &
Laughlin34 in 1937, the Court returned to the expansive Marshall
conception of federal power. Jones & Laughlin itself rejected the
notion that production was not commerce. The crucial test became,
not the crossing of state lines by the regulated activity, but whether
that activity affected commerce. Mines and mills, factories and
farms-all theretofore excluded because they were engaged in produc-
tion rather than commerce in the Court's restricted sense-were
brought within the sweep of the commerce clause, provided only that
they exerted some effect upon interstate commerce. As the Court has
more recently put it, "there is no question of Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause to include otherwise ostensibly local activities
within the reach of federal economic regulation, when such activities
sufficiently implicate interstate commerce." 35
26. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
27. See Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923),
28. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932)-
29. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost. 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
30. See, e.g., Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) (lumbering)
31. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
32. Id.
33. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
34. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186. 196-97 (1974).
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Nor, under the post-Jones & Laughlin cases, does the effect upon
commerce have to be substantial. The commerce power turns not upon
volume, but upon effect; the quantitative aspect is irrelevant. The
given individual's contribution to commerce may be trivial by itself,
but, taken together with that of others in the same position, it may be
anything but trivial. 36 Thus the Court could say, of a family-owned
restaurant, that "viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased by
Ollie's Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state was insig-
nificant . . . . -37 But Congress could rightly assume that its business
was only "representative of many others throughout the country, the
total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-
reaching in its harm to commerce. ' 38
In addition, the post-Jones & Laughlin cases adopt a concept of
causation so attenuated as to bring within the commerce power
virtually all economic activity in the nation. The Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (the statute involved in the National League of Cities case)
has been held applicable to employees engaged in the maintenance and
operation of a building in which goods were produced for interstate
commerce, 39 as well as employees of a window-cleaning company, the
greater part of whose work was on the windows of people engaged in
interstate commerce. 4 0
Under cases like these, the commerce power can support federal
regulation of all local action, "since it is conceivable that such activity,
however remotely, 'affects' commerce."'" "It is but to repeat, in
another form, the old story of the pebble thrown into the pool, and the
theoretically infinite extent of the resulting waves, albeit too tiny to be
seen or felt by the exercise of one's senses."'42 By what Chief Justice
Stone termed "a house-that-Jack-built" 43 chain of causation, there may
be brought within the sweep of the commerce clause every stage of
economic activity-even the ultimate causa causarum-which results
in any effect upon commerce.
The post-Jones & Laughlin cases also return to the Marshall defini-
tion of the power to regulate under the commerce clause. In United
States v. Darby,44  the Court expressly overruled Hammer v.
36. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
37. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964).
38. Id. at 301 (quoting Polish National Alliance of the United States v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643,
648 (1944)). Compare id. with Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
39. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1942).
40. Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 176 (1946).
41. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 527 (1942) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
42. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 94 (1942) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
43. Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 685 (19,15) (dissenting opinion).
44. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Dagenhart4 s and held that the type of inquiry into congressional
motives undertaken there was improper. Under Darby (as under
Gibbons v. Ogden) the sole question is whether a challenged federal
law does prescribe a governing rule for commerce. If it does, it is valid
regardless of the ends that may have induced its enactment.
B. Bootstrapping
The Darby case tied together the two key words in the commerce
clause (the noun "commerce" and the verb "regulate") in a manner
which gives Congress a means to extend its commerce authority
virtually as far as it wishes. Darby sustained the Fair Labor Standards
Act's prohibition against interstate shipment of goods produced by
employees whose wages and hours did not conform to the statute's
requirements. The prohibition was valid as a regulation of commerce
(i.e., it prescribed the rule by which the commerce was to be gov-
erned), regardless of the motive of controlling wages and hours in
production which induced Congress to enact the prohibition. But the
Court went further and also upheld the statute's direct requirement
that employees engaged in production conform to the federal wages
and hours standards. The Court did so both by relying upon the
"affecting commerce" rationale 46 and by using the commerce-
prohibiting technique to validate direct controls on local activities.
The commerce-prohibiting technique follows from the validity of the
statute's prohibition on interstate shipment already discussed. "Con-
gress, having by the present Act adopted the policy of excluding from
interstate commerce all goods produced for the commerce which do not
conform to the specified labor standards, it may choose the means
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even
though they involve control of intrastate activities. ' 47 The direct wage
and hour regulation of production may thus be sustained as a "neces-
sary and proper" means; i.e., one reasonably adapted to attaining the
permitted end of excluding nonconforming goods from interstate com-
merce.
The implications are far-reaching. Professor Gunther well charac-
terizes this Darby approach as a "super-bootstrap" technique.48 He
asks whether this technique would permit Congress to "regulate any
intrastate activity through a two-step bootstrap device: (1) prohibiting
interstate movement of goods or persons connected with that activity;
45. See note 33 supra.
46. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
47. 312 U.S. at 121.
48. G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 199 (gth ed 197S).
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and (2), as a 'means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the
permitted end,' directly regulating the intrastate activity. '49
The Darby technique enables us to answer the issue of the extent of
congressional power left unresolved by United States v. Five Gambling
Devices.50 The case arose out of prosecutions for dealing in gambling
devices without registering and reporting sales and deliveries as re-
quired by an Act of Congress. 5 ' The indictments did not allege that the
devices had ever moved in interstate commerce. A plurality of the
Supreme Court held that Congress had not intended the statute to
apply to such intrastate matters. 52 The lower courts, however, had gone
further and declared that, if the law did undertake to regulate such
purely intrastate transactions, it went beyond congressional power." 3
Though the plurality opinion limited itself to the holding already
referred to on congressional intent, four Justices, dissenting, did dis-
cuss the constitutional question. 54 According to them, the lower courts
were wrong in finding that Congress had exceeded its power. The
registration and filing requirements for intrastate transactions were an
appropriate means for enforcing the ban on interstate transportation of
gambling devices. 55 Yet even the dissent did not go so far as to imply
that a local activity like intrastate gambling was now wholly within
the commerce power. What it said in support of congressional author-
ity was limited to the registration and filing requirements: "If Congress
by § 3 had sought to regulate local activity, its power would no doubt
be less clear."'5 6
It is difficult to see the basis for this hesitation on the issue of
whether congressional regulatory power is valid in such a case. Under
Darby, Congress can plainly ban interstate transportation of gambling
devices and can choose "means reasonably adapted to the attainment
49. Id. at 189.
50. 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
51. Act of Jan. 2, 1951, ch. 1194, 64 Stat. 1134 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1177
(1976)).
52. 346 U.S. at 449-50 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter & Minton, JJ.). The concurring
Justices found that the statute was broad enough to cover interstate sales, but affirmed on the
ground that it was unenforceable for vagueness. 346 U.S. at 452-54 (Black, J., joined by Douglas,
J.).
53. United States v. Braun, 119 F. Supp. 646, 647 (S.I). Ga.), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v. Denmark, 119 F. Supp. 647,
649-50 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
54. 346 U.S. at 454-63 (Clark, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Reed & Burton,
JJ.).
55. Id. at 454-56 (Clark, J., dissenting). However, under Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968), the registration requirements may now be considered violative of the privilege
against self-incrimination.
56. 346 U.S. at 462 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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of the permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate
activities. T57 If registration and filing requirements are appropriate
means for enforcing the ban on interstate transportation, why is the
same not true of direct regulation, as it was in the case of the Darby
ban? If this enables Congress to bootstrap regulation of purely local
gambling to the plane of constitutional legality, that is just what the
Darby technique permits.
The Court itself has applied the Darby bootstrap technique in the
more recent case of Perez v. United States.5 8 A federal statute 9 which
made "loan sharking" (i.e., the threat of violence to collect debts) a
crime was applied to petitioner, a "loan shark" in New York City who
had used threats of violence to collect $3,000 he had loaned to the
owner of a local butcher shop. The Court affirmed petitioner's convic-
tion, stating that there was "a tie-in between local loan sharks and
interstate crime."'60 The required nexus was found in congressional
hearings and reports indicating that loan sharking furnished organized
crime with much of its revenue: "[Lloan sharking in its national setting
is one way organized interstate crime . . . syphons funds from
numerous localities to finance its national operations." '6'
Justice Stewart, who dissented, asserted that there was no rational
basis for the conclusion "that loan sharking is an activity with inter-
state attributes that distinguish it in some substantial respect from
other local crime."'62 If there is a justification, in commerce clause
terms, for the majority decision, it may be the following: "The key to
the Perez decision may be found in the difficulty of proving in each
individual case that the loan shark had an interstate connection even
when it existed."63 In other words, as a "means reasonably adapted to
the attainment of the permitted end"'64 of outlawing loan sharking with
interstate connections Congress may reach all loan sharking, even in
cases where no interstate attributes are shown; i.e., the Darby
bootstrapping technique.
C. The Outer Limits
The cases between Jones & Laughlin and Perez reveal an almost
inexorable unfolding of the commerce power. In Perez, the Court
57. 312 U.S. at 121.
58. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1976).
60. 402 U.S. at 155.
61. Id. at 157.
62. Id.
63. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime. 15 Ariz.
L. Rev. 271, 278 (1973).
64- 312 U.S. at 121.
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stated that it had, after more than a century, returned to the sweeping
view of Marshall. 65 Yet, in its recent decisions, the Court has con-
strued the power more broadly than the great Chief Justice had ever
done. "Even a lawyer who fought for a realistic interpretation which
would recognize that in commercial matters the United States was one
nation finds himself surprised at where we are now-and at how readily
the recent expansion is accepted." '66
The "ease with which the public and the judiciary now swallow the
federal regulation of what were once deemed exclusively local mat-
ters" 67 has led to the natural question of whether any limitations still
remain upon the commerce power. In posing that question in 1972,
this writer stated that "[a] categorical answer is anything but easy. To
attempt to draw the outer limits of this plenary power is to essay what
the highest Court has expressly refrained from undertaking. '68
Six years later, this statement is still accurate. But we now have
suggestive indications that the Constitution does not permit Congress
to sweep within its control any and all activities carried on in the
country. That the commerce clause even today does not go to that
extreme is indicated by a recent case which involved the constitutional-
ity of a federal law enacted to protect wild horses and burros on
federal lands. A three-judge district court ruled the statute invalid,
holding that it could not be sustained under the commerce clause
because the wild burros in question did not migrate across state lines.
69
The Supreme Court did not deal with the commerce clause issue, since
it was able to sustain the statute under Congress' power to regulate
federal property.70 Even under today's expanded commerce clause,
however, it is difficult to see how nineteen wild burros on federal
grazing land in New Mexico can have even the most attenuated effect
on commerce.
Yet even if that be true, it hardly involves a limitation of practical
import upon the reach of federal regulatory power. The same cannot
be said of National League of Cities and the limitation imposed by it.
Under that decision, governmental activities of the states themselves
are beyond the reach of the commerce power. The consequence, as
Justice Brennan has noted, 7' is a revival of the doctrine of state
sovereignty as a barrier to federal power.
65. 402 U.S. at 151.
66. Stern, supra note 63, at 284.
67. Id.
68. B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law: A Textbook 104 (1972) (footnote omitted).
69. New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd sub nor. Kleppe v.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
70. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535-41 (1976).
71. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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What is particularly striking about the revived doctrine is that it
may apply to all state activities, rather than only to those which may
be considered to involve essential governmental functions. 72 In an era
of expanding state activity, this may have significant implications:
A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it own and operate a railroad, a
mill, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges. street lights, or a
sewage disposal plant. What might have been viewed in an earlier day as an
improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed
indispensable. 73
Does this mean that, as the states take over activities traditionally
within the realm of private enterprise, the activities become immune
from the reach of federal regulatory power? As states undertake more
and more social and economic functions that not too long ago were
thought to be beyond the legitimate sphere of government, will these
functions be placed beyond the outer limits of the commerce power?
IV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES
"What is the fundamental characteristic of the United States consid-
ered as an association of states?"74 asks the leading English study of
federal government. The answer that it offers is the principle that the
general and regional governments are coordinate and independent in
their respective spheres.
The answer seems to be that the Constitution of the United States establishes an
association of states so organized that powers are divided between a general govern-
ment which in certain matters ... is independent of the governments of the associated
states, and, on the other hand, state governments which in certain matters are, in their
turn, independent of the general government."-
Maintenance of the federal system requires a doctrine of inter-
governmental immunities, so that both federal and state governments
can remain independent of each other. The starting point of the
doctrine was, of course, Marshall's now classic opinion in McCulloch
v. Maiyland.76 Building upon his famous dictum that "the power to
tax involves the power to destroy,1 77 Marshall laid down a broad
principle of immunity for federal agencies from state taxation78 and,
by implication, state regulation.
72. See notes 96-102 infra and accompanying text.
73. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 591 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
74. K. Wheare, Federal Government 2 (4th ed. 1964).
75. Id. (footnote omitted).
76. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
77. Id. at 429.




After McCulloch, it was assumed that implicit in its holding was a
reciprocal doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, which protected
the states as well as the federal government. 79 During this century,
however, it appeared settled that the earlier assumption of equivalence
in intergovernmental immunities was unwarranted.8 0 Federal immu-
nity is grounded squarely upon the supremacy clause, which covers all
valid federal action. There is no basis for distinguishing between
different federal agencies because of the nature of the functions that
they perform. A different rule applies to state immunity. It is based not
upon a categorical constitutional command like the supremacy clause,
but upon implications arising from the nature of federalism. 8' If that is
the case, state immunity extends only as far as necessary to preserve
the states themselves. Only when a state agency is performing an
essential governmental function is there immunity from federal laws.
If, on the contrary, the function is not one traditionally associated with
government, there is no exemption.
These principles have been applied both to immunity from taxa-
tion 82 and immunity from regulation. A federal regulatory law could
not operate to curtail the exercise by a state of its essential governmen-
tal functions. On the other hand, where a state engages in economic
activities that are validly regulated by the federal government when
engaged in by private persons, the state too may be forced to conform
its activities to federal regulation. 83 When a state operates a railroad,
the railroad must comply with the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 84 as
well as the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act85 and the
Railway Labor Act. 86
The most recent of the pre-National League of Cities cases-
Maryland v. Wirtz 87-upheld an amendment to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act 8 which extended federal wage and hour requirements to
employees of state-operated schools and hospitals. The Court rejected
79. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576 (1946).
80. Id. at 577.
81. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414 (1933).
82. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (federal tax on sale of mineral waters
by state); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (federal tax on sale of liquor by
state).
83. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968).
84. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970); see United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
85. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (part I); see California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553,
564 & n.10 (1957).
86. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970); see California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 563-68 (1957).
87. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
88. Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102, 80 Stat. 830 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
203(d), (s)(4) (1970)).
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the claim that the amendment interfered with sovereign state func-
tions, stating:
[V]alid general regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce
because a State is involved. If a State is engaging in economic activities that are
validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the
State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation. 9
The dividing line under these decisions, it was thought, was be-
tween cases in which the states were performing functions which could
only be performed by the states as states-"Only a State can own a
Statehouse" 9°--and those where the states were engaged in activities
not essential to government as we have traditionally known it. The
distinction was developed in the cases on the constitutional immunity
of state instrumentalities from federal taxation, where "we look to the
activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking the
boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power." 91
The just-quoted statement is from the opinion in United States v.
California,92 where it was held that a state-operated railroad was
subject to the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 93 That case went even
further than the discussion in the last paragraph; after noting the line
drawn in the tax cases, the Court stated: "But there is no such
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can
no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress
than can an individual. '94
The National League of Cities opinion expressly rejects this assertion
that there is no limitation comparable to that upon federal taxing
power upon the commerce power: "[W]e have reaffirmed today that the
States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or
a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to
regulate commerce. We think the dicta from United States v. Califor-
nia, simply wrong." 95 Does this mean then, as the Wirtz decision
seemed to imply, that state immunity from federal regulation under the
commerce power turns upon the same principles that restrict federal
taxing power exerted against the states?
The National League of Cities decision struck down the 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act on the ground that they
89. 392 U.S. at 196-97.
90. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572. 582 (1946)
91. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
92. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
93. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
94. 297 U.S. at 185.
95. 426 U.S. at 854-55 (footnotes omitted).
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displaced state policies regarding the manner in which delivery of
governmental services such as police and fire protection would be
structured. As such, "the challenged amendments operate to directly
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions. '96 Had the Court chosen to do so,
it could have made its National League of Cities decision consistent
with that in Wirtz, since, as the National League of Cities opinion
recognized, "there are obvious differences between the schools and
hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments
affected here."'97 The Court did not, however, base its decision on
these "obvious differences." Instead, it overruled Wirtz, refusing to
distinguish between federal regulation applicable to state and local
agencies such as police and fire departments and those (as in Wirtz)
applicable only to schools and hospitals.
The Court in National League of Cities declined to distinguish
between the two types of state functions because "each provides an
integral portion of those governmental services which the States and
their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." 98
The implication is that all state and local agencies that provide such
governmental services are now immune from federal laws. If this is
correct, Natibohal League of Cities turns around the law of intergov-
ernmental imifiunities, so far as state immunities are concerned.
United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz were based on the
premise that "[ilf a State is engaging in economic activities that are
validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by
private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to
federal regulation." 99 The railroad in California and the schools and
hospitals in Wirtz fell within the principle thus stated.
As already noted, a distinction was not drawn in National League of
Cities between state employees working in schools and hospitals, on
the one hand, and policemen and firemen, on the other. Though the
Court concedes that "[t]here are undoubtedly factual distinctions be-
tween the two situations,"' 00 it indicated that the immunity from the
commerce power regulation applied to both. The question no longer is
whether the state is performing a function which only government
performs, as opposed to engaging in activities which are also engaged
in by others. The test now is whether the state is performing a service
96. Id. at 852.
97. Id. at 855.
98. Id. (footnote omitted).
99. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197; see United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 183-84.
100. 426 U.S. at 854.
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which the states "have traditionally afforded their citizens," 10 1 or
whether the state "activity to which the congressional command was
directed was . . . in an area that the States have regarded as integral
parts of their governmental activities."' 102 Operation of schools and
hospitals has for years been considered an integral part of state
activities, even though both were originally operated solely as private
institutions and, even today, there is still an important private sector
in the field of education and health. 10 3
National League of Cities distinguished the state activity at issue in
United States v. California, stating that, as the operation of a railroad
engaged in common carriage, it was not in an area which the states
have traditionally regarded as integral parts of their governmental
services. The difficulty is that pointed out by Justice Douglas in his
dissent in New York v. United States10 4: the area of state activity from
which immunity is removed is one of particular significance to modern
government, which is increasingly undertaking social and economic
functions that a century ago were thought beyond the sphere of
government. "A State's project is as much a legitimate governmental
activity whether it is traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or
conducted for profit .... What might have been viewed in an earlier
day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities
may today be deemed indispensable.'1 0
V. SPENDING POWER
In his dissent in National League of Cities Justice Brennan asserted
that the decision effected "a catastrophic judicial body blow at Con-
gress' power under the Commerce Clause . . . [but] Congress may
nevertheless accomplish its objectives-for example, by conditioning
grants of federal funds upon compliance with federal minimum wage
and overtime standards.' 0 6 The implication is that Congress may use
its spending power to achieve indirectly the aim of state compliance
with wage and hour requirements which, under National League of
Cities, it could not achieve directly by regulation under the commerce
clause.
101. Id. at 855 (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 854 n.18.
103. See generally Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137. 1143 (2d Cir- 1973)
(private law school); Barrett v. United Hospital, 376 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.DN.Y. 1974) (privale
hospital).
104. 326 U.S. 572, 590-98 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissentingl.
106. 426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Brennan assertion is based upon the expansion of the congres-
sional power to tax and spend that has occurred during the past forty
years. The development of the taxing and spending power in this
respect has paralleled that of the commerce power itself. Under
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 107 the commerce power might not be used to
prohibit interstate transportation if the congressional purpose was to
regulate production which, under the restricted definition followed
before 1937, did not constitute commerce. 10 8 In United States v.
Butler, 109 the same approach was applied to the power to tax and
spend. The Court there struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933.110 It sought to eliminate overproduction of food products by
providing farmers with financial inducements to curtail production. A
processing tax was levied on agricultural commodities, and the pro-
ceeds used to pay farmers who reduced their productive acreage. The
congressional purpose was plainly regulation of agricultural produc-
tion, and such a purpose rendered the law invalid. Congress could not,
under the pre-Jones & Laughlin decisions, directly regulate agricultural
production; I I nor could it do so indirectly under the guise of its power
to tax and spend, through what Justice Stone termed a scheme of
"purchased regulation."'' 12
The cases since Butler have repudiated the limitation imposed by that
decision upon the taxing and spending power. The Court has rejected
the Butler approach that barred utilization of taxing power to accom-
plish regulatory ends arguably beyond the direct authority of Congress.
The courts no longer look behind a tax law to see whether it is
motivated by an improper purpose.113 The same is also now true
where spending of revenue is concerned. The Social Security Act
cases 1 14 settled that funds disbursed to promote what Congress deemed
the general welfare could not be invalidated because the money was
being spent to induce action in an area that Congress might not be able
to control directly.
The breadth of the congressional spending power was underscored
by the entire Court in Buckley v. Valeo, "l which upheld the public
107. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
108. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
109. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
110. Ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (current version codified in s:attered sections of 5, 7 U.S.C.).
111. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
112. 297 U.S. at 85 (dissenting opinion).
113. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 25-31 (1953).
114. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937).
115. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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financing provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,116
as amended, against challenges that public financing of presidential
election campaigns was contrary to the general welfare. The Court
declared that the general welfare clause is a "quite expansive [grant of
power]. . . It is for Congress to decide which expenditures will pro-
mote the general welfare.. .. Whether the chosen means appear 'bad,'
'unwise,' or 'unworkable' to us is irrelevant."'' 7 The power of the
purse may be conditioned in ways that Congress deems "necessary and
proper" to promote the general welfare;" 8 Congress may impose
conditions that must be complied with before particular funds are
disbursed. Conditional grants-in-aid have been a major instrument in
changing the federal balance during the past four decades.
Nor may congressional grants be condemned because the money is
spent to induce action by the states which Congress could not compel.
This was settled by Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, "'9 the first Social
Security Act case, and confirmed in Oklahoma -v. United States Civil
Service Commission. 120 The latter case is particularly significant in the
context of National League of Cities. It involved application of the
Hatch Act 12' provision that no state official employed in activities
financed in whole by federal funds should take any active part in
political activities. The United States Civil Service Commission or-
dered the removal of a state Highway Commissioner who was state
Democratic chairman. If the state did not comply, it risked a reduction
in federal highway grants. The Court rejected Oklahoma's claim that
federal funds could not be conditioned on the state's compliance with
the Hatch Act. "While the United States is not concerned with, and
has no power to regulate, local political activities as such of state
officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money
allotments to states shall be disbursed."' 12 2
The relevance of the Oklahoma case to the question of whether
Congress could use its spending power to accomplish what National
League of Cities v. Usey held was prohibited under the commerce
power is apparent. The underlying principles of federalism upon which
the National League of Cities decision was based also prevent Congress
116. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (current version codified in scattered sections of 2. 18, 26
U.S.C.).
117. 424 U.S. at 90-91.
118. Id. at 91.
119. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
120. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
121. Ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (current version codified in scattered sections of 2. 18, 26
U.S.C.).
122. 330 U.S. at 143.
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from imposing a direct prohibition upon political activities by state
employees. Yet Oklahoma allowed Congress to attain the same result
by conditioning its grants to the state. The Court blandly assumed that
such an "offer of benefits to a state by the United States dependent
upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the
general welfare, is not unusual."'1 23 If a condition such as that in the
Hatch Act is not unusual, why should a condition on federal grants
that states follow wage and hour requirements be treated any differ-
ently?
The National League of Cities opinion itself specifically stated: "We
express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Con-
gress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by
exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution
such as the spending power.' 24 Under the cases discussed, particu-
larly Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, con-
gressional power to impose wage and hour requirements as conditions
to federal grants appears settled.
The Court's refusal in National League of Cities to take a position on
the matter does not expressly affect the established case law. One may
nevertheless wonder whether the National League of Cities majority
would be receptive to use of the spending power as a device to
accomplish the very result held forbidden under the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974.
If the contrary is true and Congress can affect integral functions of
state governments by exercise of the spending power, National League
of Cities itself imposes no more than a formal barrier to congressional
encroachments upon state operations. Provided that Congress act
through conditions imposed upon grants rather than through direct
exercises of other enumerated powers, the "limits upon the power of
Congress to override state sovereignty,"' 12 5 which National League of
Cities so eloquently proclaimed, will prove nonexistent. If that is the
case, was there any real point to the National League of Cities
decision? Was it truly necessary for the Court to march the king's men
up the hill in a commerce clause case only to offer to march them down
ignominiously if the spending power were instead invoked?
VI. CONCLUSION
One may sympathize with the National League of Cities effort to
preserve the states as independent governments, free from federal
123. Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
124. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
125. Id. at 842.
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control in their integral operations. One can, however, be left with a
modest doubt as to whether the Court has drawn a workable line to
mark the area of state immunity. The prior cases (notably United
States v. California126 and Maiyland v. Wirtz 127 ) had distinguished
between state functions such as operation of schools and hospitals and
those such as providing police and fire protection.' 28 However, Na-
tional League of Cities holds that there is no basis for this distinction
since all the functions are an integral part of those governmental
services which the states have traditionally provided. Does this mean
that all state officers who provide services which the states have
furnished for some years are now beyond the reach of federal regula-
tion? Perhaps the states should be free from the federal wage require-
ment which "directly supplants the considered policy choices of the
States' elected officials and administrators as to how the) wish to
structure pay scales in state employment.' 2 9 Is the same true of other
federal requirements, such as safety regulations 130 or the national
speed limit imposed during the gas crisis? 131
In some ways, the most disturbing aspect of the National League of
Cities decision is the Court's gratuitous revival in it of the concept of
state sovereignty. Even those who applaud the effort to hold back the
onrushing flood of federal power may feel some unease at the language
used by the Court, which relies on the attributes of state sovereignty to
strike down an infringing federal law. State sovereignty has not been a
viable legal concept since the ratification of the Federal Constitution.
That fundamental document is basically inconsistent with the notion of
the states as separate sovereignties, an inconsistency recognized since
the classic decisions of the Marshall Court and reinforced by the
decision at the Appomattox Courthouse over a century ago.
Perhaps the National League of Cities opinion was only employing
Humpty Dumpty's method 32  in using the language of state
sovereignty. But the Court cannot use a term with the connotations
that "state sovereignty" has always had without lending its imprimatur
to state sovereignty advocates and the baneful effect that the) have
had throughout our history. The Court itself has consistently been the
126. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
127. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
128. See notes 87-99 supra and accompanying text.
129. 426 U.S. at 848.
130. The Occupational Safety and Health Act now excludes the states and their subdivisions
from its definition of employer. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970).
131. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1974, at 1. col. 7.
132. " 'When I use a word,' Humpt, Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.' " L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, ch. 6.
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strongest opponent of state sovereignty, whether its claims were raised
in opposition to federal enforcement of fugitive slave laws in the
North 13 3 or the equal protection guaranty in the South. 134 Now
apparently the Court itself has revived the ghost with what Justice
Brennan terms its "novel state-sovereignty doctrine,"' 135 a doctrine
which even resurrects the notion of the tenth amendment as "an
express declaration of [a state sovereignty] limitation.' 3 6 Yet such a
notion had seemingly been put to rest in a famous passage in the Darby
case. 137
The Court, of course, was only seeking to answer the question at
issue in the case before it. If some of its language was intemperate,
that was by no means unusual for contemporary judicial opinions. The
evil that may be done by raising the ghost of state sovereignty may,
however, outlive the immediate decision of the Court, important
though it may be. Regardless of the merits of the decision and its
implications for the commerce power and intergovernmental im-
munities, it is unfortunate that the Court saw fit to frame its opinion in
terms of state sovereignty. It is to be hoped that, in future cases
involving ramifications of the National League of Cities decision, the
Justices will take the occasion to repudiate the state sovereignty
language used by them. Hopefully this will occur before states' rights
extremists are able to employ National League of Cities to gain a
mantle of respectability.
133. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
134. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
135. 426 U.S. at 863 (dissenting opinion).
136. Id. at 861 (dissenting opinion).
137. "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered." 312 U.S. at 124. The quotation is referred to in both the plurality and dissenting opinions
in National League of Cities. Compare 426 U.S. at 842-43 with id. at 862-63.
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